Universal	Hinges	and	the Bounds	of	Sense Mark	Fortney Forthcoming	in	Philosophia,	2019 7000	words This	is	a	penultimate	draft.	Please	cite	the	published	version	at	Philosophia's	website. Abstract: According	to	Danièle	Moyal-Sharrock,	Wittgenstein's	On	Certainty	presents	a	theory	of hinges,	and	hinges	have	a	role	to	play	in	a	foundationalist	epistemology	(2013,	this journal).	Michael	Williams	(2005)	and	Annalisa	Coliva	(2013,	this	journal)	have	claimed that	the	hinges	are	not	suitable	to	play	such	a	role	as	they	are	not	shared	universally. Moyal-Sharrock	has	replied	that	a	subset	of	the	hinges	is	suitable	to	play	such	a	role: the "universal"	hinges,	an	account	of	which	she	developed	in	her	2004	book	Understanding	on Certainty	(2013,	this	journal).	I	argue	that	for	Moyal-Sharrock's	reply	to	be	sustained,	she must	construe	the	set	of	universal	hinges	much	more	narrowly	than	she	does	currently.	For instance,	Moyal-Sharrock	claims	that	"I	have	a	brain"	is	a	universal	hinge,	which	consigns people	who	know	nothing	about	brains	to	stand	outside	the	bounds	of	sense.	I	also	provide a	novel	way	of	thinking	about	the	universal	hinges,	which	I	argue	is	better	textually motivated	than	Moyal-Sharrock's	own	way,	and	which	provides	a	set	of	hinges	more suitable	to	play	a	role	in	foundationalist	epistemology. 2 Introduction According	to	Danièle	Moyal-Sharrock,	Wittgenstein's	On	Certainty	presents	a	theory of	hinges.	On	Moyal-Sharrock's	view,	hinges	are	"animal"	and	"nonepistemic"	certainties	of ours	which	partly	constitute	our	framework	for	making	sense	of	the	world,	and	having	this framework	is	what	gives	us	the	the	capacity	to	engage	in	belief	formation,	maintenance, and	revision.	1 What	makes	hinges	animal	and	nonepistemic	for	Moyal-Sharrock	is	that they	are	not	subject	to	the	kind	of	epistemic	evaluations	that	we	use	to	categorize	beliefs. Moyal-Sharrock	argues	additionally	that	hinges	have	an	important	role	to	play	in	a foundationalist	epistemology,	despite	the	fact	that	hinges	are	not	beliefs.	More	generally, on	her	way	of	thinking,	hinges	underwrite	our	capacity	to	act	and	to	participate	in	various forms	of	life.	Because	hinges	have	so	many	roles	to	play	they	are	essential	to	understanding Wittgenstein's	final	account	of	epistemology,	and	this	paper	aims	to	advance	our understanding	of	hinges.	2 This	paper	is	about	the	distinction	between	two	of	categories	of	hinges	("local"	and "universal"),	as	well	as	the	broader	import	that	the	universal	hinges	in	particular	have	for questions	about	the	nature	of	rationality	and	the	foundations	of	our	beliefs.	I	present	a	new way	of	understanding	the	universal	hinges,	and	explain	the	significance	this	new	reading has	for	both	readers	of	Wittgenstein	and	philosophers	interested	in	foundationalist epistemologies. The	distinction	between	local	and	universal	hinges	was	introduced	by	MoyalSharrock	in	Understanding	On	Certainty.	Local	hinges	are	hinges	shared	by	groups	of	people in	a	particular	place	and	time,	whereas	universal	hinges	are	shared	by	everyone	within	the "bounds	of	sense".3	The	correct	characterisation	of	the	universal	hinges	is	therefore	of particular	philosophical	significance.	After	all,	the	way	we	answer	the	question	"What	is	it 1	Understanding	On	Certainty	p.	67,	p.	108.	More	generally,	see	"Ch	4:	The	Features	of	Hinges". 2	"On	Coliva's	Judgmental	Hinges"	p.	24 3	Understanding	On	Certainty	p.	103 3 to	make	sense	or	be	rational?"	is	going	to	be	fixed	by	how	we	characterize	the	universal hinges,	and	is	in	itself	a	question	of	general	philosophical	significance. I'll	argue	that	Moyal-Sharrock	frequently	incorrectly	categorizes	local	hinges	as universal	hinges,	which	results	in	developing	an	overly	narrow	way	of	construing	the bounds	of	sense.	Moreover,	I'll	argue	that	there	is	textual	evidence	that	Wittgenstein	would have	agreed	with	my	more	inclusive	way	of	thinking	about	the	bounds	of	sense. Additionally,	while	Moyal-Sharrock	identifies	universal	hinges	one	by	one,	I	move	forward on	the	question	of	how	to	characterize	universal	hinges	by	specifying	the	underlying principle	that	explains	why	the	universal	hinges	are	universal. On	my	interpretation,	the	genuinely	Wittgensteinian	universal	hinges	are	those	that are	required	to	participate	in	language	games,	and	therefore	(as	I	will	argue)	the	set	of universal	hinges	includes	hinges	like	"I	am	not	the	only	person	that	exists"	and	"There	is	an external	world".	Moyal-Sharrock's	account	of	universal	hinges,	by	contrast,	includes	details about	human	life	that	go	above	and	beyond	this	sparse	account	of	the	universal	hinges.	For instance,	she	counts	"I	have	a	brain"	as	one	of	the	universal	hinges.	But	one	can	obviously fail	to	know	biological	trivia	like	that	and	still	manage	to	stand	within	the	bounds	of	sense. Lastly,	I'll	finish	the	paper	by	explaining	how	my	account	of	the	universal	hinges turns	out	to	be	essential	to	Moyal-Sharrock's	ambition	of	using	hinges	to	play	a	role	in	a foundationalist	epistemology.	My	account	of	the	universal	hinges	is	therefore	motivated	in three	separate	ways:	it	makes	the	bounds	of	sense	appropriately	inclusive,	it's	textually motivated	by	claims	in	On	Certainty,	and	it	suitable	for	playing	the	epistemological	role	that Moyal-Sharrock	wants	an	account	of	universal	hinges	to	be	able	to	play. §1.	Moyal-Sharrock	on	Local	and	Universal	Hinges For	Moyal-Sharrock,	the	set	of	local	hinges	varies	with	time,	place,	and	culture.4	For example,	consider	the	hinge	"People	can	walk	on	the	moon",	which	is	currently	a	local hinge	for	me	and	many	of	the	people	that	live	in	the	same	city	that	I	do	(problem	all	of them,	but	philosophers	are	cautious).	It	is	a	hinge	that	we	acquire	through	training	- 4	Understanding	On	Certainty	p.	102,	p.	136 4 continual	repetition	of	facts	that	presuppose	its	truth	might	partly	constitute	such	training. As	a	member	of	my	culture,	I	have	been	frequently	exposed	to	messages	that	took	it	for granted	that	people	can	walk	on	the	moon,	starting	from	fairly	early	on	in	my	life,	and	this is	why	"People	can	walk	on	the	moon"	is	a	hinge	for	me. By	contrast,	someone	like	Descartes	was	never	exposed	to	(most	of)	the	media	and other	background	conditions	that	I	was	exposed	to	while	acquiring	most	of	my	hinges,	and for	him	"People	can	walk	on	the	moon"	was	not	a	hinge.	This	is	why	"People	can	walk	on the	moon"	is	a	local	hinge:	it	is	shared	by	some	groups	at	some	times,	but	not	by	all	of	them. As	a	result,	Descartes	and	I	had	different	frameworks	for	approaching	the	world	and forming,	maintaining,	and	revising	beliefs	about	the	world. But	on	Moyal-Sharrock's	way	of	thinking,	there	is	at	least	some	sort	of	overlap between	the	framework	with	which	I	approach	the	world	and	the	framework	with	which Descartes	approached	the	world.	And	that	seems	like	it	must	be	right.	On	her	way	of thinking,	both	of	our	sets	of	hinges	must	have	included	the	universal	hinges.	According	to Moyal-Sharrock,	the	universal	hinges	form	the	bounds	of	sense.	They	are,	on	her	account, the	minimal	context	that	all	forms	of	life	have	in	common.5	Moyal-Sharrock	also	frames	her account	of	universal	hinges	by	contrasting	Wittgenstein	(with	whom	she	agrees)	with Quine	(with	whom	she	disagrees).	While	Quine	would	say	that	any	commitment	of	ours	can be	given	up,	in	the	right	sort	of	circumstance,	Moyal-Sharrock	argues	that	on	Wittgenstein's view	universal	hinges	(as	well	as	some	other	hinges)	just	cannot	be	given	up.6 Moyal-Sharrock	argues	that	we	can	see	evidence	for	this	attitude	in	Wittgenstein's riverbank	metaphor.	Here	is	one	of	his	descriptions	of	the	riverbank	metaphor (from	On Certainty):	"And	the	bank	of	the	river	consists	partly	of	hard	rock,	subject	to	no	alteration	or only	an	imperceptible	one".7	Moyal-Sharrock	argues	that	it	would	be	a	mistake	to	think	that any	part	of	the	hard	rock	of	the	riverbank	(which	corresponds	to	all	of	a	person's	hinges)	is subject	to	only	imperceptible	alterations.	Instead,	she	wants	to	read	the	passage	as	saying that	some	parts	of	the	riverbank	are	subject	to	no	alteration	and	some	other	parts	of	the 5	Understanding	On	Certainty	p.	150 6	Understanding	On	Certainty	p.	103 7	On	Certainty	§99 5 riverbank	are	subject	to	imperceptible	alterations.8	Thus,	Moyal-Sharrock's	claim	is	that what	she	identifies	as	universal	hinges	are	what	Wittgenstein	would	have	called	parts	of the	bedrock	(i.e.,	the	set	of	a	person's	hinges)	that	are	not	subject	to	any	alteration. With	these	general	points	about	universal	hinges	on	hand,	we	can	move	on	to discussing	some	of	Moyal-Sharrock's	specific	claims	about	of	what	the	universal	hinges	are. For	example,	Moyal-Sharrock	suggests	that	"the	world	exists"	is	a	universal	hinge.9 The	claim	that	such	a	hinge	cannot	be	given	up	does	seem	reasonable.	Our	possession	of hinges	is	shown	in	the	way	we	live	our	lives,	and	it	does	not	seem	like	a	human	could	really deny	in	their	actions	that	there	is	an	external	world	while	engaging	in	all	sorts	of typically	human	activities	talking,	eating,	walking.	Of	course,	in	the	philosophy	classroom someone	might	verbally	express	doubt	about	the	external	world,	or	even	claim	not	to believe	in	its	existence,	but	it	seems	like	such	a	person	is	in	fact	just	incorrectly characterizing	what	is	a	hinge	that	cannot	be	given	up	for	them.	And	it	is	by	now	a	familiar point	that	there	is	in	many	cases	a	vast	gulf	between	what	agents	say	that	believe	and	what agents	actually	believe,	and	it	seems	reasonable	to	extrapolate	that	introspection	is	as liable	to	lead	us	astray	about	hinges	as	it	is	to	lead	us	astray	about	beliefs.10 Moyal-Sharrock	then	goes	on,	to	tell	us	that	several	other	hinges	are	universal hinges,	including	Moore's	truisms	from	his	defense	of	common	sense.11	I	think	a	case similar	to	the	one	I	made	above	could	be	made	for	each	of,	or	at	least	the	majority	of,	these hinges.	These	are	hinges	that	seem	like	they	cannot	be	genuinely	given	up	by	people	acting in	the	world,	despite	the	fact	that	people	might	claim	to	have	beliefs	or	doubts	that	are incompatible	with	genuine	acceptance	of	these	hinges. In	the	next	section	of	the	paper,	I	will	describe	what	independently	motivates	the claim	that	these	hinges	do	belong	in	the	set	of	universal	hinges.	But	first	I	will	also	describe the	problem	that	arises	as	Moyal-Sharrock	continues	to	enumerate	the	universal	hinges. 8	Understanding	On	Certainty	p.	148 9	Understanding	On	Certainty	p.	149 10	See,	e.g.,	Eric	Schwitzgebel's	"Acting	Contrary	to	Our	Professed	Beliefs,	or	the	Gulf	Between	Occurrent Judgment	and	Dispositional	Belief". 11	Understanding	On	Certainty	p.	149 6 §2.	The	Bounds	of	Sense	Are	Broader	Than	Moyal-Sharrock	Contends Moyal-Sharrock	goes	on	to	tell	us	that	to	the	above	set	of	universal	hinges	we	can add	"diverse	other	universal	hinges",	besides	the	ones	corresponding	to	Moore's	truisms, belong	to	the	set	of	universal	hinges,	again	without	argument.12	Some	of	the	hinges	she suggests	that	we	can	add	to	the	set	are	"Humans	cannot	turn	into	birds	or	birds	into humans"	and	"A	human	baby	cannot	look	after	itself",	"Human	beings	are	not	made	of glass"	and,	in	another	chapter,	"I	have	a	brain".13.	I	agree	with	her	that	Wittgenstein	seems to	treat	these	claims	as	hinges,	but	disagree	with	the	claim	that	he	would	have	thought	of them	as	universal	hinges. The	demonstration	that	these	extra	hinges	cannot	be	universal	is	fairly	simple. Consider	"I	have	a	brain".	The	existence	of	brains	must	have	been	an	early	scientific discovery;	thus,	some	sort	of	practice	of	empirical	enquiry	must	have	been	in	place	before any	human	could	have	truly	had	the	hinge	"I	have	a	brain".	But	on	Moyal-Sharrock's account,	first	discoveries	are	treated	as	empirical	propositions,	and	then	after	repeated exposure,	they	are	fused	into	our	bedrocks	and	become	hinges	instead	.14 Thus,	not	only	did	the	agents	discovering	brains	need	to	have	some	sort	of	fairly complex	practice	in	place	before	discovering	brains,	but	they	also	needed	to,	for	some	time, treat	"I	have	a	brain"	as	an	empirical	proposition	before	having	it	as	a	hinge.	But	MoyalSharrock	seems	to	be	committed	to	saying	that	the	humans	who	lived	prior	to	the discovery	of	brains	were	beyond	the	bounds	of	human	sense	beyond	the	minimal	form	of life	that	we	all	participate	in.	This	can't	be	right. When	Moyal-Sharrock	claims	that	"I	have	a	brain"	is	a	universal	hinge,	she	does	not actually	argue	for	it,	but	she	does	cite	On	Certainty	§159,	and	so	it	would	be	worthwhile	to examine	it	and	see	if	it	provides	grounds	for	taking	"I	have	a	brain"	to	be	a	universal	hinge. The	passage	reads:	"As	children,	we	learn	facts;	e.g.,	that	every	human	has	a	brain,	and	we take	them	on	trust".	So	it	seems	like	Moyal-Sharrock	has	mistaken	Wittgenstein	to	be	using 12	Understanding	On	Certainty	p.	150 13 Understanding	On	Certainty	p.	10 14	Understanding	On	Certainty	p.	155 7 "we"	to	refer	to	"all	humans"	or	"everyone	within	the	bounds	of	sense"	rather	than something	more	cautious,	like	"my	contemporaries". It	seems	more	charitable	to	think	that	Wittgenstein	is	making	the	more	cautious claim	here.	This	helps	us	resist	attributing	to	him	the	view	that	before	children	learn	that they	have	brains,	they	actually	stand	outside	the	bounds	of	sense.	Even	if	there	is	some stage	of	development	before	which	children	stand	inside	the	bounds	of	sense,	surely learning	about	their	brains	is	not	what	makes	the	difference. In	general,	this	precise	problem	and	alternative	more	charitable	explanation	arises for	most	of	the	implausible	universal	hinges	that	Moyal-Sharrock	considers.	That	is,	for most	of	the	hinges	that	she	counts	as	universal,	it	seems	as	though	she	did	this	on	the	basis of	Wittgenstein	saying	that	such-and-such	a	hinge	was	a	hinge	for	him	and	for	his	readers. While	claims	of	this	sort	are	compatible	with	the	thesis	that	Wittgenstein	thought	that	they concerned	universal	hinges,	they	are	also	compatible	with	the	thesis	that	Wittgenstein thought	that	they	concerned	local	hinges,	and	this	is	the	more	plausible	reading. Now	I'll	run	through	this	argument	a	few	more	times	through	citing	specific universal	hinges	that	Moyal-Sharrock	attributes	to	Wittgenstein	alongside	the	passages from	On	Certainty	that	allegedly	provide	support	for	this	interpretation. This	is	a	useful passage	in	which	Moyal-Sharrock	identifies	some	of	her	universal	hinges	and	their	sources in	the	text	all	at	once,	which	I'll	use	to	structure	my	discussion: 'The	earth	exists',	'There	are	physical	objects',	'Things	don't systematically	disappear	when	we're	not	looking',	'If	someone's head	is	cut	off,	the	person	will	be	dead	and	not	live	again',	'Trees do	not	gradually	change	into	men	and	men	into	trees',	'I	have	a brain',	'I	am	a	human	being',	'I	have	forbears'	(OC	209,	35–6,	[134], 274,	513,159,	4,	234,	from	Understanding	On	Certainty	p.	X).15 Now	I'll	demonstrate	that	the	text	better	supports	interpreting	most	of	these	hinges	as local	hinges	rather	than	universal	hinges. Let's	begin	first	with	"The	earth	exists"	as	a	universal	hinge,	which	Moyal-Sharrock 15	Understanding	On	Certainty	p.	104	cites	section	234	in	this	list	rather	than	134,	which	is	the	correct	citation. Thank	you	to	an	anonymous	referee	for	raising	this	to	my	attention. 8 bases	on	On	Certainty	§209.	Claiming	that	"The	earth	exists"	is	a	universal	hinge	seems	to render	the	bounds	of	sense	overly	narrow:	"after	all,	what	are	we	to	say	of	the	perfectly sensible	people	that	existed	and	talked	about	this	earth	before	calling	it	the	earth,	or	using any	particular	concept	to	refer	to	the	earth? On	Certainty	§209	reads:	"The	existence	of	the	earth	is	rather	part	of	the	whole picture	which	forms	the	starting-point	of	belief	for	me."	(emphasis	mine)	Moyal	Sharrock's interpretation	seems	to	miss	that	in	this	passage	Wittgenstein	says	"for	me".	What	he	says is	also	perfectly	compatible	that	"The	Earth	exists	is	a	local	hinge,	and	moreover	that	view does	not	face	the	problem	of	narrowness	that	I	have	raised. Next	we	can	move	on	to	"I	have	forebears",	which	Moyal	Sharrock	bases	on	On Certainty	§234.	Again,	to	insist	that	the	agent	who	for	whom	such	a	proposition	does	not	go without	saying	stands	outside	the	bounds	of	sense	seems	overly	restrictive.	On	Certainty §234	reads: "I	believe	that	I	have	forebears,	and	that	every	human	being	has them.	I	believe	that	there	are	various	cities,	and,	quite	generally,	in the	main	facts	of	geography	and	history.	I	believe	that	the	earth	is	a body	on	whose	surface	we	move	and	that	it	no	more	suddenly disappears	or	the	like	than	any	other	solid	body:	this	table,	this house,	this	tree,	etc.	If	I	wanted	to	doubt	the	existence	of	the	earth long	before	my	birth,	I	should	have	to	doubt	all	sorts	of	things	that stand	fast	for	me. Moyal-Sharrock	claims,	on	the	basis	of	this	passage,	that	"I	believe	that	I	have	forebears"	is a	universal	hinge.	But	again,	in	this	passage	Wittgenstein	is	making	a	claim	about	what	he believes	and	what	the	people	around	him	believe	rather	than	a	claim	about	the	bounds	of sense	in	general.	This	is	compatible	with	reading	him	as	making	a	claim	about	a	local	hinge rather	than	a	universal	hinge.	And	reading	him	as	making	a	claim	about	local	hinges	is	more charitable,	on	account	of	the	fact	that	it	doesn't	attribute	an	overly	narrow	account	of	the bounds	of	sense	to	him. Next	we	can	move	on	to	"If	someone's	head	is	cut	off	he	is	dead	and	will	never	live again",	which	Moyal-Sharrock	bases	on	On	Certainty	§274.	On	Certainty	§274	reads: 9 One	such	is	that	if	someone's	arm	is	cut	off	it	will	not	grow	again. Another,	if	someone's	head	is	cut	off	he	is	dead	and	will	never	live again.	Experience	can	be	said	to	teach	us	these	propositions. However,	it	does	not	teach	us	them	in	isolation:	rather,	it	teaches	us	a host	of	interdependent	propositions.	If	they	were	isolated	I	might perhaps	doubt	them,	for	I	have	no	experience	relating	to	them. In	this	passage,	Wittgenstein	says	that	this	is	a	hinge	had	by	"us".	But	the	"us"	here	could refer	to	his	contemporaries	rather	than	any	agent	that	stands	within	the	bounds	of	sense. And	it	seems	implausible	to	suggest	that	an	agent	who	believes	that	one	can	recover	from losing	their	had	stands	outside	the	bounds	of	sense.	Yes,	such	an	agent	is	wrong,	but	having a	false	belief	is	not	sufficient	for	standing	outside	the	bounds	of	sense. Moyal-Sharrock's	underlying	method	of	identifying	universal	hinges	seems	to	be descriptive	rather	than	explanatory	or	predictive.	What	I	mean	by	a	descriptive	method	of identifying	hinges	is	the	following	method:	imagine	that	we	could	represent	each	human's bedrock	as	a	set	H	containing	hinges	{h1,	h2,	...}	for	every	hinge	the	human	has	in	their bedrock.	We	might,	then,	be	tempted	to	conclude	that	given	the	set	of	hinges	for	every	past, future,	and	present	human,	we	could	look	at	the	intersection	of	all	the	sets	and	then conclude	that	we	had	discovered	the	set	of	universal	hingesafter	all,	the	intersection	of	all these	sets	is	the	set	of	hinges	that	all	humans	share. The	problem	with	this	method	is	that	it	will	identify	too	many	hinges	not	only	will it	identify	the	genuinely	universal	hinges,	it	will	simply	also	identify	the	local	hinges	that	all cultures,	as	a	matter	of	coincidence,	happen	to	share.	This	is	something	like	the	mistake	a psychologist	makes	when	they	observe	a	cultural	universal	and	then	conclude	that	the universal	has	emerged	as	a	result	of	some	characteristic	of	human	nature.	Such	a conclusion	might	be	true,	but	it	might	also	be	the	case	that	similar	groups	of	people,	facing similar	challenges,	have	in	many	cases	developed	similar	ways	of	addressing	those challenges. This,	I	think,	explains	why	Moyal-Sharrock	thinks	it	is	plausible	to	say	that	hinges like	"Humans	cannot	turn	into	birds"	are	universal.	She	believes	that	knowing	about	birds and	their	properties	is	part	of	the	human	form	of	life	–	perhaps	because	of	the	assumption 10 that	all	human	cultures	have	come	into	contact	with	birds,	and	noticed	that	humans	cannot turn	into	birds.	Fair	enough:	they	all	probably	have	come	into	contact	with	birds,	and	made such	a	realization.	But	that	does	not	entail	that	that	does	not	entail	that	a	failure	to	come into	contact	with	birds	and	think	about	the	relationship	between	birds	and	humans consigns	someone	to	stand	without	the	bounds	of	sense. It	is	a	mistake	to	think	that	accidents	like	this	should	have	any	bearing	on	our understanding	of	what	it	is	to	stand	within	the	human	bounds	of	sense	we	ought	to	be able	to	account	for	possible	cases	like	the	possible	group	of	people	that	has	never	seen birds,	and	to	correctly	conclude	they	still	stand	within	the	human	bounds	of	sense.	Our method	of	identifying	universal	hinges	should,	instead,	be	explanatory	or	predictive:	we should	first	understand	what	universal	hinges	are,	and	then	use	that	understanding	to generate	a	list	of	the	universal	hinges.16 §3.	A	Positive,	Explanatory,	Predictive	Account	of	Universal	Hinges What	is	it	to	be	rational?	How	should	we	really	answer	the	question,	"Which	hinges constitute	the	bounds	of	sense?"	These	questions	are	too	large	to	persuasively	answer,	in	a general	sense,	in	one	paper.	What	I	will	argue	is	that	Wittgenstein's	answer	to	this	question might	rule	out	the	hinges	that	I	have	contended	are	local	rather	than	universal.	Getting clear	on	Wittgenstein's	contribution	to	this	debate	will	not	settle	it,	but	it	will	be	a contribution	that	helps	move	the	conversation	forward. Wittgenstein's	answer	to	such	a	question	is	probably	that	what	unifies	all	human forms	of	life	is	having	the	ability	to	participate	in	language	games;	specifically,	having	the ability	to	participate	in	relatively	complex	language	games	typical	human	speech	rather than	the	slab	fetching	discussed	early	in	the	Philosophical	Investigations.	Then	we	need	to ask	what	sort	of	animal	certainties	an	agent	must	have	to	have	the	ability	to	participate	in 16 In Understanding On Certainty, after introducing universal hinges, Moyal-Sharrock says that she will address	the	objection	that	they	are	not	genuinely	universally	shared	(p.	103).	But	she	does	not	consider	cases involving a simple lack of capacity, as I do here. Instead, she considers cases where members of certain cultures	seem	to	have	hinges	or	beliefs that	are the	negations	of	her	universal	hinges	(pp.	175-76).	But	my category	of	counterexample	is	different	in	kind	from	this	sort	of	counterexample.	My	counterexamples	do	not concern	people	who	believe	that	we	can	turn	into	birds,	but	instead	just	people	who	don't	think	anything	at all	about	birds;	similarly,	my	counterexamples	do	not	concern	people	that	think	we	have	sawdust	instead	of brains	in	our	skulls,	but	instead	just	people	who	lack	any	beliefs	about	brains	(and	so	on). 11 language	games	those	certainties	are	the	universal	hinges.	Agents	who	lack	those certainties	are	the	ones	who	are	actually	beyond	the	human	bounds	of	sense.	Thinking	of things	in	these	terms,	I	contend,	rules	out	Moyal-Sharrock's	implausible	universal	hinges (like	"I	have	a	brain")	and	rules	in	her	plausible	universal	hinges	(like	"The	world	exists"	or "There	are	other	minds"). First,	consider	"the	world	exists".	Given	that	gaining	the	ability	to	participate	in language	games	requires	extensive	training,	any	agent	that	has	learned	to	participate	in language	games	will	have	to	be	relatively	skilful	at	interacting	with	the	world	any	agent with	such	a	skillset	must,	in	their	lives,	display	that	"the	world	exists"	is	in	their	bedrock. Similarly,	it	looks	like	several	of	Moore'	truisms	are	the	sorts	of	things	that	must	be	hinges in	someone's	bedrock	in	order	for	them	to	acquire	the	ability	to	participate	in	complex language	games.	For	example,	Moore	says	that	he	knows	with	certainty	that	he	has perceived	other	humans,	and	we	do	need	to	interact	with	other	humans	while	we	are	young in	order	to	acquire	language. Now	consider	some	of	Moyal-Sharrock's	problematic	hinges-	"I	have	a	brain",	for example.	Do	agents	need	to	have	that	hinge	in	their	bedrock	in	order	to	have	the	ability	to participate	in	complex	language	games?	Obviously	not:	there	are	a	lot	of	language	games that	don't	involve	the	relatively	complex	concept	"brain",	and	it's	complex	enough	that	it should	be	clear	that	having	a	hinge	concerning	brains	is	not	something	that	could	form	the foundation	of	a	basic	human	ability.	Similarly	the	case	for	"Men	don't	turn	into	birds"while this	is	true,	and	obvious	for	any	member	of	a	culture	that	is	exposed	to	birds,	it	is	just	as obvious	that	there	is	no	conceptual	link	between	having	the	ability	to	participate	in complex	language	games	in	general	and	having	a	hinge	concerning	the	question	of	whether men	can	turn	into	birds. §4.	Hinges	and	Foundationalism I	think	my	account	of	the	universal	hinges,	while	it	simply	enjoys	independent motivation	as	I	argued	above,	should	also	be	adopted	because	it	would	help	MoyalSharrock	respond	to	an	objection	that	Michael	Williams	and	Annalisa	Coliva	have	raised	to the	contention	that	hinges	can	be	used	roughly	as	"basic	beliefs"	in	a	foundationalist 12 epistemology.	First	I'll	explain	this	objection,	and	why	Moyal-Sharrock's	current	response to	the	objection	is	unsatisfying.	Then	I'll	explain	why	my	account	of	the	universal	hinges allows	us	to	better	support	the	view	that	hinges	can	play	a	role	in	a	foundationalist epistemology. Michael	Williams	has	articulated	this	objection	in	his	paper	"Why	Wittgenstein	Isn't a	Foundationalist".	There	are	two	steps:	first,	he	claims	that	for	the	foundationalist,	the foundations	of	our	beliefs	must	be	universally	shared	by	all	knowers:	Williams	writes: "This	is	certainly	the	view	of	traditional	foundationalists,	for	whom genuine	foundations	are,	indeed	must	be,	universal.	We	might	say, this	commitment	is	what	makes	foundationalism	a	theory	of knowledge."17 Next,	he	claims	that	Wittgenstein's	hinges	are	clearly	not	universally	shared	by	knowers, and	therefore	obviously	not	fit	to	play	the	role	of	the	foundations	of	our	knowledge: This	objection	brings	us	back	to	universality,	for	it	underestimates the	degree	of	heterogeneity	that	Wittgenstein	finds	in	'basic' certainties.	Some	certainties	are	perceptual	judgments	about	objects in	our	surroundings	('Here	is	one	hand').	Others	are	general propositions,	belonging	to	the	scaffolding	of	our	Moorean	common sense	('The	Earth	has	existed	for	many	years	past').	Still	others	are presuppositions	of	quite	specialized,	thus	potentially	culturally specific,	forms	of	inquiry	(history,	geology,	physics).	Thus	while some	certainties	may	be	universal,	others	need	not	be,	and	some manifestly	aren't.18 Thus,	according	to	Williams,	hinges	vary	between	people	and	times	and	cultures,	which prevents	them	from	being	universal,	which	prevents	them	from	play	a	role	in	a foundationalist	epistemology. Annalisa	Coliva	has	expressed	the	same	point,	for	instance	in	her	2012	reply	to Moyal-Sharrock	and	other	commentators: As	to	(i),	of	course	some	of	Wittgenstein's	hinges	are	universal,	but surely	not	all	of	them.	"My	name	is	AC"	is	a	hinge	for	me,	not	for	any 17	"Why	Wittgenstein	Isn't	a	Foundationalist"	p.	50 18	"Why	Wittgenstein	Isn't	a	Foundationalist"	p.	54 13 other	person,	although	it	is	to	be	expected	that	each	person	will	have his	own	similar	hinge-i.e.	"My	name	is	NN".19 Like	Williams,	Coliva	believes	that	hinges	will	vary	too	much	between	people	to	serve	as the	foundations	of	our	beliefs. At	this	point	in	the	paper,	it	should	be	clear	both	what	Moyal-Sharrock's	answer	to this	objection	is,	and	how	my	view	of	universal	hinges	improves	her	answer.	MoyalSharrock's	answer	to	this	objection	is	to	say	that	there	is	a	special	class	of	hinges	such	that they	are	shared	by	everyone	within	the	bounds	of	sense	–	the	aptly	named	"universal hinges"	and	that	these	hinges	are	suitable	to	play	a	role	in	a	foundationalist epistemology.20 But	the	problem	is	that	Moyal-Sharrock's	universal	hinges	are	still	relatively heterogeneous,	and	include	hinges	that	are	not	shared	by	everyone	within	the	bounds	of sense,	such	as	"I	have	a	brain".	Perhaps	this	is	why	commenters	like	Williams	and	Coliva have	continued	to	press	their	point. Given	the	way	that	Moyal-Sharrock	develops	the concept	of	a	universal	hinge,	it	really	is	non-obvious	that	the	concept	of	universal	hinges does	anything	to	address	this	objection	on	the	grounds	of	universalizability. However,	adopting	my	account	of	the	universal	hinges,	according	to	which	the universal	hinges	are	the	ones	that	are	necessary	to	participate	in	language	games,	does	give Moyal-Sharrock	the	resources	to	address	the	problem	raised	by	Williams	and	Coliva.	Once our	notion	of	the	universal	hinges	is	sparser	than	Moyal-Sharrock's	original	notion,	the universal	hinges	stop	seeming	so	heterogeneous,	and	start	seeming	like	they	might	be	the genuinely	universal	foundations	of	our	knowledge.	21 19	"Replies"	p. 85 20	She	has	made	this	reply	in	"On	Coliva's	Judgmental	Hinges"	p.	24 21	Moyal-Sharrock	has	also	put	the	universal	hinges	to	the	theoretical	use	of	explaining	the	sense	in which	Wittgenstein is not a relativist (see Moyal-Sharrock 2017). She argues that the universal hinges provide a cross-cultural standard for a shared human form	of life. Like	Moyal-Sharrock, I think	that	this	is	an	urgent	and	important	theoretical	use	for	the	universal	hinges,	but	I	argue	that the	category	of	universal	hinges	needs	to	be	refined	before	we	put	it	to	work	like	this. 14 §5.	Universal	Hinges,	Pritchard's	über	hinge,	and	Coliva's	extended	rationality Finally,	I'd	like	to	consider	my	account	of	the	universal	hinges	in	relation	to	two similar	concepts:	Duncan	Pritchard's	"über	hinge",	and	Annalisa	Coliva's	"extended rationality".	In	Epistemic	Angst,	Pritchard	notes	that	at	first	pass,	the	category	of	hinges seems	rather	heterogeneous: "...	Wittgenstein	writes,	for	example,	about	hinges	concerning	the fact	that	one	has	never	been	to	the	moon	(e.g.,	OC,	§106)	or	that	one's name	is	such	and	such	(e.g.,	OC	§425).	But	in	each	case	the	'hinge'	in question	seems	very	relative	to	the	particular	circumstances	of	the person	in	question:	what	age	they	live	in,	who	they	are,	where	they were	raised,	and	so	on."	(Pritchard	2016	p.	95) Pritchard	then	argues	that	this	heterogeneity	is	actually	delusive,	and	that	all	the	hinges	are derived	from	one	hinge	which	is	shared	across	times	and	cultures.	He	calls	this	hinge	the "über	hinge",	and	says	that	the	über	hinge	commitment	is	the	"entirely	general	hinge commitment	that	one	is	not	radically	and	fundamentally	mistaken	in	one's	beliefs". (Pritchard	2016	p.	96)	According	to	Pritchard,	at	various	times	and	places,	this	hinge causes,	or	does	not	cause,	subjects	to	have	hinges	like	"No	one	has	ever	been	to	the	moon". We	can	see	Pritchard's	account	as	offering	a	competing	answer	to	the	question	of this	paper,	"How	should	we	characterize	the	universal	hinges?",	although	I	should	emphasize that	Pritchard	does	not	explicitly	make	that	suggestion	here	himself.	According	to	this proposal,	we	should	say	that	there	is	just	one	universal	hinge,	the	über-hinge,	rather	than identifying	the	universal	hinges	with	the	range	of	hinges	that	enable	participation	in language	games.	I	think	that	the	proposal	that	the	universal	hinges	just	are	the	über-hinge fails	as	an	interpretation	of	Wittgenstein	in	On	Certainty	because	of	Wittgenstein's	view	on the	relationship	between	doubt	and	belief.	Wittgenstein	wrote:	"The	child	learns	by believing	the	adult.	Doubt	comes	after	belief."	(§160)	I	read	this	passage	as	not	making	a purely	developmental	claim,	but	also	more	broadly	making	a	claim	about	which	capacity	is more	fundamental	than	the	other	–	namely,	that	belief	is	more	fundamental	than	doubt. And	although	this	passage	is	about	belief	and	doubt	rather	than	hinges,	I	think	it's reasonable	to	infer	from	this	passage	that	Wittgenstein	would	say	that	simple	declarative 15 hinges,	like	"men	cannot	turn	into	birds",	come	before	more	complex	hinges	concerning doubts,	like	"I	am	not	currently	radically	deceived". But	on	Pritchard-inspired	proposal	that	I	am	considering	here,	the	bounds	of	sense are	constituted	by	the	über	-hinge,	and	the	über-hinge	causes	us	to	have	various	particular hinges,	like	that	(e.g.)	people	cannot	turn	into	birds	or	that	the	earth	exists.	(And	I	note again	that	this	is	a	proposal	that	I	am	entertaining	in	this	section,	rather	than	a	proposal that	Pritchard	has	made	explicitly.)	Therefore,	through	suggesting	that	the	hinge	related	to entertaining	and	rejecting	doubts	is	more	fundamental	or	primitive	than	hinges	related	to forming	beliefs	or	taking	other	actions	related	to	birds	and	the	earth,	the	Pritchard-inspired proposal	under	consideration	seems	get	things	backwards	from	the	Wittgensteinian perspective	articulated	in	§160.	We	should	prefer	accounts	of	the	universal	hinges	that cohere	better	with	that	perspective,	and	my	proposal	in	this	paper	is	one	such	account.	It also	seems	like	children	who	have	achieved	the	capacity	to	believe	but	not	yet	achieved	the capacity	to	entertain	and	reject	sceptical	scenarios	stand	within	the	bounds	of	sense, contrary	to	the	prediction	that	the	the	über	–hinge	is	what	constitutes	the	bounds	of	sense. Now	we	can	move	on	to	the	relationship	between	my	view	and	Coliva's	extended rationality	view.	In	Extended	Rationality,	Coliva	presents	a	view	of	rationality	in	general and	applies	it	to	skeptical	problems.	Coliva	argues	that	certain	assumptions,	like	"there	is an	external	world",	are	partly	constitutive	of	rationality,	and	shared	by	the	skeptic	and	nonskeptic	alike	(pp.	128-129).	The	account	she	presents	is	Wittgenteinian	in	spirit,	although not	intended	to	be	a	direct	reading	of	an	account	of	rationality	that	Wittgenstein	endorsed in	On	Certainty	(throughout	the	course	of	her	book,	Coliva	develops	a	variety	of	interesting views	and	families	of	views	that	respond	to	the	problem	of	skepticism). It's	worth	remarking,	however,	on	the	similarities	between	her	account	of rationality	and	the	account	of	rationality	that	I	have	generated	through	analyzing	textual evidence	concerning	the	category	of	the	universal	hinges	in	On	Certainty.	Although	Coliva does	not	fully	specify	the	list	of	assumptions	that	she	takes	to	be	constitutive	of	rationality, the	list	includes	assumptions	like	"There	is	an	external	world",	"Our	sense	organs	are mostly	working	reliably",	and	"One	is	not	the	victim	of	a	lucid	and	sustained	dream",	and	so 16 her	list	overlaps	with	the	list	of	universal	hinges	that	I	have	developed	over	the	course	of this	paper.	This	overlap	speaks	in	favour	of	the	idea	that	Coliva	and	Wittgenstein	converged upon	the	same	concept	of	rationality,	rather	than	one	which	was	just	similar	in	spirit.	While her	explanatory	goal	is	finding	the	best	concept	of	rationality	for	her	purposes	in	Extended Rationality,	rather	than	finding	the	concept	of	rationality	outlined	by	the	universal	hinges, it	seems	to	me	that	both	those	goals	take	us	to	the	same	place. That	being	said,	I	also	think	that	it	is	a	virtue	of	Wittgenstein's	account,	and	MoyalSharrock's	account,	to	explicitly	preserve	the	category	of	the	local	hinges.	The	local	hinges are	things	that	we	use	in	just	the	same	way	that	we	use	the	universal	hinges,	but	they	vary across	time	and	place	in	dramatic	ways	–	notoriously,	Wittgenstein	had	a	hinge	concerning the	impossibility	of	travel	to	the	moon,	and	we	do	not	(§108).	Coliva's	account	of	rationality does	not	seem	sensitive	to	these	variations	in	how	humans	in	different	times	and	places engage	in	belief	formation, which	focuses	on	addressing	traditional	skeptical	challenges about	the	external	world	rather	than	the	more	day-to-day	belief	formations	and	actions that	are	guided	by	the	local	hinges.22 §5.	Conclusion I	have	argued	that	many	hinges	Moyal-Sharrock	takes	to	be	universal	are	actually local.	This	problem	motivated	me	to	present	a	new	general	principle	that	explains	what universal	hinges	are:	they	are	the	animal	certainties	that	constitute	(or	at	least,	are necessary	for	having)	the	ability	to	participate	in	language	games.	This	principle	generates a	suitably	broad	account	of	the	bounds	of	sense	and	is	compatible	with	Wittgenstein's various	remarks	about	hinges. 22	Here	is	a	further	note	about	the	heterogeneity	of	hinges.	Ashton	(2019)	points	out	that	factors	like	race	and gender,	as	well	as	e.g.	locality,	the	narrowest	factor	that	I	consider	here,	can	contribute	to	the	justification	that a	subject	has,	and	probably	also	to	the	hinges	that	a	subject	has.	This	seems	like	an	important	point	to	keep	in mind	for	theorists	developing	their	own	hinge	epistemologies	today	and	going	forwards.	I	don't	include	these factors	in	this	discussion	because	(in	this	paper)	I	am	one	of	the	writers	on	hinges	focusing	on	what	Ashton calls	"faithfulness":	"whether	or	not	the	account	[of	hinges]	faithfully	reconstructs	the	text	of	On	Certainty	and accurately	represents	Wittgenstein's	intentions."	(p.	155)	To	my	knowledge,	his	hinges	sometimes	seem	local, and	sometimes seem	personal,	but	don't seem to concern	social categories,	which	would stand in	between those	two	levels	of	specificity. 17 I	will	close	with	considering	a	couple	of	potential	objections.	First,	my	notion	of what	it	is	to	be	in	the	human	bounds	of	sense	is	in	fact	so	broad	that	it	will	include,	say, hypothetical	intelligent	Martians	who	know	nothing	of	what	Moyal-Sharrock	included	in the	human	form	of	life	–	for	instance,	the	hinge	proposition	that	humans	cannot	turn	into birds	but	who	are	capable	of	participating	in	complex	language	games	of	their	own.	And perhaps	such	a	notion	of	the	human	form	of	life	seems	too	broad. This	line	of	thought	is	mistaken.	Moyal-Sharrock's	account	of	the	human	form	of	life focuses	too	much	on	biological	trivia	("humans	cannot	turn	into	birds,	"human	babies	need to	be	cared	for").	But	what	seems	to	be	genuinely	important	about	the	bounds	of	sense	is something	other	than	a	hinge	concerning	biological	trivia.	From	the	Wittgensteinian perspective,	in	any	case,	what	matters	are	things	like	rationality,	complexity	of	thought,	and the	ability	to	communicate.	Agents	with	these	features	and	abilities	stand	within	the bounds	of	sense,	and	those	who	lack	them	stand	without	those	bounds.	If	there	turn	out	to be	Martians	with	language	games	of	their	own,	then	surely	they	belong	in	the	bounds	of sense,	just	as	much	as	a	human	that	can	participate	in	language	games	but	that	doesn't know	anything	about	the	brain. Secondly,	I	will	consider	an	objection	about	whether	my	interpretation	of Wittgenstein	violates	his	constraints	on	philosophizing. I	have	argued,	so	far,	for	two independent	claims.	First,	I	have	argued	that	Moyal-Sharrock's	list	of	universal	hinges simply	seems	too	long,	and	to	draw	the	bounds	of	human	sense	too	narrowly.	Second,	I have	argued	that	we	can	use	an	explanatory,	predictive	account	of	hinges	to	understand Wittgenstein's	actual	account	of	the	universal	hinges.	This	explanatory	and	predictive account	is	motivated	by	Wittgenstein's	various	remarks	about	hinges.	Given	Wittgenstein's frequent	exhortations	to	describe	rather	than	explain:	for	instance,	"I	want	to	say	here	that it	can	never	be	our	job	to	reduce	anything	to	anything,	or	to	explain	anything.	Philosophy really	is	'purely	descriptive'."	(1958	p.	18),	one	might	wonder	whether	I	have	offered	an	unWittgensteinian	explication	of	Wittgenstein's	views.	However,	it	is	not	my	claim	that	he endorsed	this	explanatory	account	explicitly.	Thus,	I	am	not	claiming	that	Wittgenstein	set out	to	violate	his	dictum	against	explaining.	Instead,	I	have	argued	that	–	perhaps 18 surprisingly	doing	some	explaining	can	help	us	understand	Wittgenstein's	concept	of	the universal	hinges. More	broadly,	I	think	we	should	expect	different	styles	of	philosophizing	to	be suitable	to	different	contexts,	and	that	in	some	contexts	more	or	less	explanation	might	be called	for.	As	my	work	in	this	paper	shows	us,	this	particular	context	is	one	in	which	some description	and	some	explanation	can,	together,	help	us	achieve	our	goal	of	understanding the	universal	hinges. References Ashton,	N.	(2019).	"The	Case	for	a	Feminist	Hinge	Epistemology".	Wittgenstein-Studien.	10 (1):153-163 Coliva,	A.	(2013).	"Replies".	Philosophia	41:81–96 Coliva,	A.	(2015).	Extended	Rationality:	A	Hinge	Epistemology.	Palgrave-Macmillan. Moyal-Sharrock, D. (2004). Understanding Wittgenstein's On Certainty. Basingstoke: Palgrave	Macmillan. Moyal-Sharrock,	D.	(2013)	"On	Coliva's	Judgmental	Hinges"	Philosophia	41:13–25. Moyal-Sharrock,	D.,	&	Brenner,	W.	H.	(Eds.).	(2005).	Readings	of	Wittgenstein's	On	Certainty. Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan. Moyal-Sharrock, D. (2017). "Fighting Relativism: Wittgenstein and Kuhn". In Katharina Neges, Josef Mitterer, Sebastian Kletzl & Christian Kanzian (eds.), Realism Relativism Constructivism :	Proceedings	of	the	38th	International	Wittgenstein	Symposium	in	Kirchberg. De	Gruyter.	pp.	215-232. Pritchard,	D.	(2016).	Epistemic	Angst:	Radical	Skepticism	and	the	Groundlessness	of	Our Believing.	Princeton	University	Press. Schwitzgebel,	E.	(2010).	"Acting	Contrary	to	Our	Professed	Beliefs,	or	The	Gulf	Between Occurrent	Judgment	and	Dispositional	Belief".	Pacific	Philosophical	Quarterly,	91,	531-553. Williams,	M.	(2005)	"Why	Wittgenstein	Isn't	a	Foundationalist"	in	Moyal-Sharrock	& Brenner	(2005),	47–58. Wittgentein,	L.	(1958).	The	Blue	and	Brown	Books.	Harper	and	Row. Wittgenstein,	L.	(1969).	On	Certainty.	Oxford:	Blackwell.